THREATIST.IORead the docs Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs Security Update
Released 2026-08-12 · Red Hat rating Important · View on Red Hat →
The BIND resolver accepts validly-signed NSEC records where the "Next Domain Name" field points outside the signer's zone.
A DNSSEC validating resolver that is under a random subdomain attack against a DNSSEC-signed zone can suffer from runaway memory usage.
If a provably insecure domain is covered by both an NSEC and NSEC3 record at the parent, and there exist an RRSIG for only one of these types, then BIND may exit unexpectedly with an assertion while validating this proof…
The issue is unexpected program termination based on ordering and/or specific content in responses to queries for CNAME or DNAME, and A records.
It is possible for an attacker's zone to respond to a query with an RRSIG that has a smaller number of labels than the zone in which the RRSIG is contained.
An attacker who knows (or guesses) that a resolver uses RPZ with wildcard CNAME policies can craft query names long enough to trigger a NAMETOOLONG error condition during RPZ processing.
BIND may accept incorrect child-zone NSEC3 records as valid, which could allow an attacker to forge authenticated NXDOMAIN responses.
If BIND encounters a particular invalid data structure in a DNS record, it will accept the invalid data, and may subsequently abort and exit.