THREATIST.IORead the docs No IEEE vulnerabilities are listed in CISA KEV.
17 records
The IEEE 802.11 specifications through 802.11ax allow physically proximate attackers to intercept (possibly cleartext) target-destined frames by spoofing a target's MAC address, sending Power Save frames to the access po…
The P1735 IEEE standard describes flawed methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property (IP), as well as the management of access rights for such IP, including modification of Rights Block to remove or re…
The P1735 IEEE standard describes flawed methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property (IP), as well as the management of access rights for such IP, including modification of Rights Block to remove or re…
The P1735 IEEE standard describes flawed methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property (IP), as well as the management of access rights for such IP, including modification of a license-deny response to a…
The P1735 IEEE standard describes flawed methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property (IP), as well as the management of access rights for such IP, including modification of the encryption key and inser…
The P1735 IEEE standard describes flawed methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property (IP), as well as the management of access rights for such IP, including modification of encrypted IP cyphertext to i…
The P1735 IEEE standard describes flawed methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property (IP), as well as the management of access rights for such IP, including improperly specified HDL syntax allows use o…
The P1735 IEEE standard describes flawed methods for encrypting electronic-design intellectual property (IP), as well as the management of access rights for such IP, including improperly specified padding in CBC mode all…
A design error in the IEEE1394 specification allows attackers with physical access to a device to read and write to sensitive memory using a modified FireWire/IEEE 1394 client, thus bypassing intended restrictions that w…
The Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) algorithm in the IEEE 802.11 wireless protocol, when using DSSS transmission encoding, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a certain RF signal that causes a channel…
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that received fragments be cleared from memory after (re)connecting to a network.
Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard can be bypassed using LLC/SNAP headers with invalid length and Ethernet to Wifi frame conversion (and optionally VLAN0 headers).
Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard can be bypassed using LLC/SNAP headers with invalid length (and optionally VLAN0 headers)
Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard can be bypassed using combinations of VLAN 0 headers, LLC/SNAP headers, and converting frames from Ethernet to Wifi and its reverse.
Layer 2 network filtering capabilities such as IPv6 RA guard or ARP inspection can be bypassed using combinations of VLAN 0 headers and LLC/SNAP headers.
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated.
The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key.