HTTP response splitting in HAARG HTTP::Tiny
Key facts
- Attack vector
- Network
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Impact type
- —
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- Low · Low · None
- Fix status
- Fixed
Attack profile from CVSS 3.1 · CISA ADP. Fix status from CNA.
Summary
HTTP::Tiny versions before 0.093 for Perl do not validate CRLF in HTTP request lines or control field header values. The unvalidated inputs are the method and URI in the request line, the URL host that becomes the `Host:` header, and HTTP/1.1 control data field values. An attacker who controls one of these inputs, for example a user supplied URL passed to a webhook or URL fetch endpoint, can inject additional headers and smuggle requests to the upstream server.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
CISA ADP · SSVC 2.0.3
- Exploitation
- None
- Automatable
- Yes
- Technical impact
- Partial
The decision (Track, Attend, Act) also depends on your mission and well-being impact; see CISA's SSVC guide.
Affected products
Remediation
- Fix · CNA HTTP::Tiny (HAARG) Fixed in 0.093
Timeline
- 2026-10-02 Threatist record created from CVE-2026-7010
- 2026-10-03 Alias added: GHSA-x3qr-8f53-fg74
References
More HAARG vulnerabilities
- TI-2026-06141 Insufficiently protected credentials in HAARG HTTP::Tiny CVSS 3.1HIGH 7.1
- TI-2025-27315 Catalyst::Plugin::Session before version 0.44 for Perl generates session ids insecurely CVSS 3.1MEDIUM 6.5
Sources
- CVE-2026-7010 · CVE Program
- CVE-2026-7010 · NVD
- FIRST EPSS
- GHSA-x3qr-8f53-fg74 · GitHub Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0
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