WhatsApp MCP: Unauthenticated bridge API allows message sending and arbitrary file exfiltration
Key facts
- Attack vector
- Local
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Impact type
- Security bypass
- Confidentiality · integrity · availability
- High · High · None
- Fix status
- Fixed
Attack profile from CVSS 3.1 · CNA. Fix status from CNA. Impact type from CWE-306.
Summary
WhatsApp MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for WhatsApp, enabling Claude to read and send WhatsApp messages. Prior to version 0.2.1, the `whatsapp-bridge` HTTP API listens on `127.0.0.1:8080` without authentication and without Host header validation, and the `/api/send` endpoint accepts an absolute `media_path` parameter without confining it to a safe directory. Combined, these issues allow any local process running as the same user as the bridge to send WhatsApp messages from the paired account without authorization; the same caller to read arbitrary files readable by the user (e.g. SSH private keys, browser session data, source code, dotfiles) and exfiltrate them as WhatsApp document attachments; and/or a remote attacker to trigger the same operations via DNS rebinding from a webpage the user visits, since no Host header validation is performed. In MCP environments, "local caller" extends beyond processes the user explicitly launched — sibling MCP servers, IDE extensions, and tool-triggered flows running in the user's session can act as the effective caller. This issue is fixed in whatsapp-mcp v0.2.1 and corresponding Docker images / release artifacts. Users should upgrade immediately. The fix introduces bearer token authentication on the bridge HTTP API (configured via environment variable, required on all requests, validated with constant-time comparison); host header allow-list validation to prevent DNS rebinding; and confinement of `media_path` to a configured directory, with rejection of absolute paths outside the root and path traversal sequences. This is a breaking change for clients of the bridge API. For users who cannot immediately upgrade: Stop the bridge, or block loopback access to port 8080, when the bridge is not actively in use; avoid running the bridge alongside untrusted MCP servers, browser extensions, or other untrusted local processes; avoid browsing untrusted sites while the bridge is running (DNS rebinding mitigation); and/or run the bridge under a dedicated user account or in a sandbox/container with no access to sensitive files.
Why it matters now
SSVC decision points
CISA ADP · SSVC 2.0.3
- Exploitation
- None
- Automatable
- No
- Technical impact
- Total
The decision (Track, Attend, Act) also depends on your mission and well-being impact; see CISA's SSVC guide.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Very Good Plugins | whatsapp-mcp | before 0.2.1 | 0.2.1 | Patch available | CNA |
- whatsapp-mcp VendorVery Good Plugins Affected before 0.2.1 Fixed in 0.2.1 Patch available CNA
CPE configurations NVD · 1
| CPE | Versions | Role | Vendor |
|---|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:a:verygoodplugins:whatsapp_mcp_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | before 0.2.1 | Vulnerable | Very Good Plugins |
- cpe:2.3:a:verygoodplugins:whatsapp_mcp_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* Versions before 0.2.1 Vulnerable ·Very Good Plugins
Remediation
- Fix · CNA whatsapp-mcp (verygoodplugins) Fixed in 0.2.1
Timeline
- 2026-10-02 Threatist record created from CVE-2026-46555
References
Sources
This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. Sources and licences