RVD#2554: MiR ROS computational graph presents no authentication mechanisms
MiR100, MiR200 and other MiR robots use the Robot Operating System (ROS) default packages exposing the computational graph without any sort of authentication.
No Enabled-robotics vulnerabilities are listed in CISA KEV.
7 records in Er-lite Firmware · all components
MiR100, MiR200 and other MiR robots use the Robot Operating System (ROS) default packages exposing the computational graph without any sort of authentication.
MiR100, MiR200 and other MiR robots use the Robot Operating System (ROS) default packages exposing the computational graph to all network interfaces, wireless and wired.
Out of the wired and wireless interfaces within MiR100, MiR200 and other vehicles from the MiR fleet, it's possible to access the Control Dashboard on a hardcoded IP address.
One of the wireless interfaces within MiR100, MiR200 and possibly (according to the vendor) other MiR fleet vehicles comes pre-configured in WiFi Master (Access Point) mode.
MiR robot controllers (central computation unit) makes use of Ubuntu 16.04.2 an operating system, Thought for desktop uses, this operating system presents insecure defaults for robots.
MiR controllers across firmware versions 2.8.1.1 and before do not encrypt or protect in any way the intellectual property artifacts installed in the robots.
The BIOS onboard MiR's Computer is not protected by password, therefore, it allows a Bad Operator to modify settings such as boot order.