Vulnerabilities

MiR robot controllers (central computation unit) makes use of Ubuntu 16.04.2 an operating system, Thought for desktop uses, this operating system presents insecure defaults for robots.

The Apache server on port 80 that host the web interface is vulnerable to a DoS by spamming incomplete HTTP headers, effectively blocking the access to the dashboard.

One of the wireless interfaces within MiR100, MiR200 and possibly (according to the vendor) other MiR fleet vehicles comes pre-configured in WiFi Master (Access Point) mode.

The access tokens for the REST API are directly derived from the publicly available default credentials for the web interface.

MiR controllers across firmware versions 2.8.1.1 and before do not encrypt or protect in any way the intellectual property artifacts installed in the robots.

The BIOS onboard MiR's Computer is not protected by password, therefore, it allows a Bad Operator to modify settings such as boot order.

There is no mechanism in place to prevent a bad operator to boot from a live OS image, this can lead to extraction of sensible files (such as the shadow file) or privilege escalation by manually adding a new user with su…

Out of the wired and wireless interfaces within MiR100, MiR200 and other vehicles from the MiR fleet, it's possible to access the Control Dashboard on a hardcoded IP address.

The password for the safety PLC is the default and thus easy to find (in manuals, etc.).

MiR100, MiR200 and other MiR robots use the Robot Operating System (ROS) default packages exposing the computational graph to all network interfaces, wireless and wired.

The access tokens for the REST API are directly derived (sha256 and base64 encoding) from the publicly available default credentials from the Control Dashboard (refer to CVE-2020-10270 for related flaws).

MiR100, MiR200 and other MiR robots use the Robot Operating System (ROS) default packages exposing the computational graph without any sort of authentication.